On June 26, 1974, banks that had paid Deutsche marks to Bankhaus Herstatt were waiting for dollars in return. German authorities withdrew Herstatt’s banking license and ordered it into liquidation. At 3:30 p.m. in Frankfurt, or 10:30 a.m. in New York, its New York correspondent stopped outgoing dollar payments. One side of the exchange had become irrevocable. The other had not arrived. CPSS, 1996, p. 6.
The banks waiting for dollars had delivered value and were exposed to the full amount delivered. Any eventual recovery was a separate question from whether the payment would arrive that day. McPartland, 2006.
Other banks began holding back payments while awaiting confirmation of receipts. Galati reports that gross funds transferred through New York’s multilateral net settlement system fell by an estimated 60 percent over the next three days. That measures disrupted payment flows, not permanent creditor losses or the size of the whole foreign exchange market. Galati, 2002, p. 55.
The exposure started before the debit
A currency exchange contains two obligations. Making one transfer faster can change how long the transaction takes without changing what happens if the other transfer never becomes final.
Consider an illustrative $10 million payment to buy another currency. If that payment becomes final and the counterparty fails to deliver, the exposure is to the amount paid, not just an exchange-rate movement. This example describes principal risk; it is not an estimate of Herstatt’s losses. McPartland, 2006.
A missed receipt also creates liquidity risk. The bank may need that money to make another payment, even if the counterparty eventually pays in full. Credit loss and a need for replacement cash therefore require separate attention. Galati, 2002, pp. 57–58.
Exposure can begin before money leaves an account. If an instruction becomes impossible to cancel before the debit, the bank may already have committed its side of the exchange. New York Fed official Ernest Patrikis described the risk through the timing and finality of transfers in separate payment systems. Patrikis, 1996.
A 1996 central-bank report found minimum exposure on individual spot or forward trades lasting one to two business days for most banks surveyed. Many needed another one to two business days to establish whether the purchased currency had arrived on time. These historical findings describe practices examined for that report, not today’s market. CPSS, 1996, p. 11.
The exposure was therefore larger than a gap between banking hours. A bank needed to know when it lost the right to cancel its payment, when the incoming funds became final, and when its own staff could confirm receipt. Speeding up one of those steps could still leave the others unresolved.
Information and money can also move at different speeds. A system might report that an instruction has been accepted before the underlying transfer is complete. A bank might receive final funds before its internal process recognizes the receipt. Improving the message flow is valuable, but the risk assessment needs to follow what has happened to the money.
Link the final transfers
The design response is payment-versus-payment, usually shortened to PvP. In the 2012 Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures, Principle 12 calls for linking final settlement of one obligation to final settlement of the other. The purpose is to eliminate the principal risk that arises when one side delivers value and receives no corresponding final transfer. CPSS–IOSCO, 2012, p. 76.
The standard also makes a distinction that is easy to miss: PvP does not require the two obligations to settle at literally the same instant. The protection comes from the condition connecting their final settlement, supported by the system’s legal and operational arrangements. Similar timestamps are not a substitute for that condition. CPSS–IOSCO, 2012, p. 77.
A faster transfer reduces the waiting time. A conditional exchange changes the outcome if one participant cannot pay. A payment service needs to be clear about which improvement it offers.
One major implementation arrived decades after Herstatt. Continuous Linked Settlement, known as CLS, began operating on September 9, 2002, with 39 settlement members and seven currencies, according to the Deutsche Bundesbank. It used a multicurrency settlement arrangement built around PvP. Deutsche Bundesbank. Earlier approaches existed: a Chicago Fed history describes a PvP method introduced in 1977 for maturing currency futures. McPartland, 2006.
A protected trade can still go unsettled
PvP protects against a one-sided final exchange on transactions it covers. It does not promise that every trade will complete. Galati’s account explained that a funding failure could leave transactions unsettled and force revisions to other members’ funding schedules. A bank could avoid losing principal while still needing liquidity or a replacement trade. Galati, 2002, pp. 64–65.
For a team building an exchange service, the revealing demonstration is a failure halfway through. One participant has committed its payment; the other cannot complete. Who can cancel? Who has a claim to the funds? Which transfer is already final? A demonstration in which both participants cooperate will not answer those questions.
Herstatt’s counterparties had already paid. Their problem was collecting the dollars due in return. Any new way of exchanging value has to answer that same question: what happens to the first party’s money when the second party cannot finish?
Sources
- Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems — Settlement Risk in Foreign Exchange Transactions
BIS, March 1996, printed pp 6 and 11. Herstatt chronology and historical survey findings. The report drew on timing information from approximately 80 bank offices; its durations should not be read as current market statistics.
- Gabriele Galati — Settlement Risk in Foreign Exchange Markets and CLS Bank
BIS Quarterly Review, December 2002, pp 55–66. Historical payment-flow estimate and discussion of credit, liquidity and operational risks, especially pp 55, 57–58 and 64–65.
- John W McPartland — Foreign Exchange Trading and Settlement Past and Present
Chicago Fed Letter 223, February 2006. Principal exposure and the 1977 currency-futures approach. The dollar example is illustrative. Historical clock times follow CPSS 1996.
- Ernest T Patrikis — Developments on the Management of Foreign Exchange Settlement Risk
Federal Reserve Bank of New York remarks, April 30 1996. Timing, coordination, payment finality and the exposure period.
- CPSS and IOSCO — Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures
April 2012, Principle 12, printed pp 76–77. Conditional final settlement and the distinction from literal simultaneity. This post discusses the published principle, not the legal compliance of any particular product.
- Deutsche Bundesbank — Continuous Linked Settlement
Introduction, historical launch paragraph. September 9 2002 inception figures. Undated current membership and currency counts are not used.
Dates, quantities and technical definitions are linked to their sources. The survey findings retain their historical period. Modern examples and product implications are the author’s analysis; no estimate of Herstatt’s final creditor losses is asserted. Reviewed November 12, 2026.